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Today, the Gulf Cooperation Council (the GCC) is often praised to be the most successfully 
integrated economic/political union after the European Union. A considerable number of scholars 
devoted their works to this union. However, a large part of the analysis overlooks or does not pay 
enough attention to the fact that historically the GCC’s main purpose was not economic integration 
but maintaining regional security by means of a joint effort. Since its establishment in the year 1981 
the GCC has faced several issues those became “litmus tests” for these efforts’ success.  
Before studying these issues closely, the thesis quickly analyzes the background of the union, 
examining the threats which brought it into being and the first patterns of maintaining regional 
security. Further on, it discusses the main conflicts and contradictions within the GCC, including the 
recent Qatari conflict. It continues by analyzing the condition of each country’s army (arms, doctrine, 
and competency) and evaluating the success of the GCC’s joint effort in Yemen.  
In this thesis, I argue that that due to the contradictions between the states, lack of flexibility 
in the mechanisms of coordination and relatively low effectiveness of very expensive armies, the 
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September 1, 2017, amid the developing Qatari crisis, Qatari Minister of Foreign 
Affairs claimed that the boycott against Qatar initiated by the other GCC members puts the 
whole Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) at risk. He claimed that the countries conducting 
this boycott “have put the Gulf Cooperation Council at risk by violating its basic principles, 
and directly resorting to attacking a nation member, instead of opting for conflict resolution 
measures.”1 He also emphasized, that Qatar trusted the GCC as an organization, but there 
was no certainty if this trust would remain in the future. After over 35 years of its existence, 
the Council has come to the arguably most risky and uncertain point of its existence. 
What would the fall and failure of the GCC mean to the world? The second, 
probably raising uncertainty and volatility of the oil markets. Also, the stronghold of the 
US influence in the Middle East would become instable, leading to further instability in the 
region. Even now, when the crisis outcome remains unclear, Iran is already trying to 
leverage the situation to its benefit, and it would definitely maintain this strategy in the case 
of any further escalation. If the GCC falls apart, the consequences will be serious and hard 
to predict, as today the GCC remains an important player on the international arena, and in 
regional affairs its importance is hard to overestimate. This influence touches upon every 
single sphere: economic, political, cultural, and social. Due to that, the recent crisis has 
become an important topic for the entire world. This thesis will discuss performance of the 
GCC in the security sphere (in this work we will look upon it in the context of military 
performance and cooperation) which is definitely among the most crucial ones in today’s 
world. 
                                                 
1 “Qatar accuses the boycotting countries of putting the Gulf Cooperation Council at risk,” Middle East 
Monitor, September 1, 2017 
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As the young political/economic union unity was developing and its importance 
was growing, it attracted the attention of scholars and analytics. In the year 1986 Emile A. 
Nakleh published his monograph, The Gulf Cooperation Council: Policies, Problems, and 
Prospects, discussing the first initiatives of the Council and analyzing the potential future 
of the entity.2 Since then, multiple monographs, papers and articles have appeared, each 
analyzing a different aspect of the GCC existence. The opinions about the unity’s potential 
success varied. A large part of the research was devoted to processes of economic 
integration. In the year 2012 Maxim Subh emphasized that all the development was 
happening in the background of very serious inner contradictions which could present a 
threat to the GCC’s future.3 However, Galina Kosjunina and Nikolay Lomakin in 2014 did 
not see these contradictions as a serious threat.4 
Some of the works concentrate on political and economic development – for 
instance, after the Arab Spring, Christopher Michael Davidson analyzes the history of the 
GCC and disputes between the states and within each of them in After the Sheikhs: The 
Coming Collapse of the Gulf Monarchies.5 He comes to a conclusion, that “internal 
pressures and weaknesses are nonetheless already manifest, or soon to be so, in all of the 
Gulf Monarchies.” He also points out the importance of external pressures and claims that 
the future of the GCC states seems bleak. On the contrary, Russian scholars Elena 
Melkumyan and Grigory Kosach in their article The Gulf Cooperation Council as regional 
                                                 
2 Emile A. Nakhel The Gulf Cooperation Council: policies, problems, and prospects (New York: Praeger, 
1986) 
3 Subh, Maxim. “ССАГПЗ: интеграция на фоне серьезных внутренних противоречий” [GCC: 
Integration Against the Background of Serious Internal Contradictions]. Институт Ближнего Востока 
[Institute of the Middle Eastern Studies], June 14, 2012. http://www.iimes.ru/?p=14935 
4 Galina Kostjinina and Nikolai Lomakin, «Эволюция экономической интеграции в рамках ССАГПЗ,» 
[Evolution of Economic Integration inside the GCC framework], Russian Herald of Foreign Economy, 
2014, no 6., 101 
5 Christopher M. Davidson, After the Sheikhs: The Coming Collapse of the Gulf Monarchies (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2013), 295 
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military and political organization conclude the GCC seems capable of modernizing the 
Council after the Arab Spring and avoiding further regional crisis.6 This opinion is shared 
by Bandar Salman Mohammed Al-Saud, who analyses GCC security cooperation from the 
standpoint of jurisprudence and finds considerable success in the security sphere of 
development.7 
The contradictions inside the GCC have already become a leitmotif in scholar 
discussion regarding any dimension of the Council’s existence. The military cooperation 
sphere, which has arguably been the most important one for the GCC since the very 
beginning, does not represent any exception. For instance, both Faisal Mohammed Alsiri 
and Glenn P. Kuffel Jr. mention this problem in their works and connect it to the issue of 
ineffective chain of command in the Peninsula Shield Force (joint military force of the 
GCC).8 The same conclusion is made by Elena Melkumyan and Grigory Kosach, who 
acknowledge the “differences” between the states as a significant factor which slows down 
progress in the sphere of security. On the other hand, Dr. Al-Rawashdeh Mohammad Salim 
did not mention the conflict of interests as one of the main threats to the GCC, concentrating 
more on the external threats, such as Iran.9  
All of these works do a valuable job developing the topic of the GCC’s role in 
regional security and its capability of maintaining it, but each of them misses several 
important aspects out. For instance, Faisal Mohammed Alsiri and Glenn P. Kuffel Jr. 
                                                 
6 Melkumyan, Elena and Kosach, Grigory, “[Совет Сотрудничества Арабских Государств Залива как 
региональная военно-политическая организация]”, “The Gulf Cooperation Council as regional military 
and political organization,” The University of Moscow Herald 25, no. 4 (2012) 
7 Bandar Salman Mohammed Al-Saud. The GCC Security Convention: A Legal And Practical Analysis, 
PhD diss. University of Glasgow, 1997 
8 Glenn P. Kuffel, The Gulf Cooperation Council’s Peninsular Shield Force, (Report, Naval War College, 
2000) 
9 Al-Rawashdeh Mohammad Salim, “Gulf Cooperation Council States (GCC), Military Power, between 
Temporary Alliances and Permanent Joint Mechanisms,” International Journal of Humanities and Social 
Science Invention, August, 2015-4, no 8. http://www.ijhssi.org/papers/v4(8)/Version-2/I0482071088.pdf 
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devote their works almost exclusively to the PSF, even though this institution has never 
been the main instrument in reaching regional security. Al-Rawashdeh Mohammad Salim 
provides a good analysis of external threats but does not devote much attention to internal 
ones. He published the article in 2014, but now, after the outbreak of the Qatari crisis, we 
can understand the real importance of this missed factor. The article by Melkumyan and 
Kosach seems the most balanced one among these, but since it was written in 2012, the 
authors devoted a great deal of attention to the documents and statements of the GCC 
officials. Later developments in the region showed that some of the described projects were 
effective and operational only “on paper.”  
For this reason, I decided to create a work which would analyze the GCC’s 
capability of protecting regional security, and in which I would try to find a balance 
between practical and theoretical aspects of the issue, with emphasis on the practical. The 
main purpose of theoretical analysis in this thesis is to understand the aims of the GCC in 
the security sphere – and practical analysis will determine their capability of reaching these 
aims.  
Chapter 1 describes the idea of the GCC as regional security guarantor, analyzes its 
appearance and development and mentions the obstacles to this development. It discusses 
the capability of the PSF as an instrument of maintaining regional security. The Qatari 
crisis, also described in this Chapter, serves as evidence for the severity of the 
contradictions which the GCC countries deal with while trying to accomplish their task. 
Chapter 1 treats general security concepts and political interests primarily on a theoretical 
basis. Chapter 2 is devoted to isolated analysis of every GCC member’s discrete military 
capability based on military expenditure rates, arms transfers contracts, annual military 
reports and other sources of information. This Chapter allows us to determine vectors of 
each state’s military development and strategies chosen by different governments. Chapter 
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3, which analyzes the GCC intervention in Yemen, shows how these strategies are applied 
in a real warfare, and analyzes whether they are successful or not. The conclusion 
summarizes the analysis results and estimates the GCC states’ military capability of 
maintaining regional security.  
In this thesis I argue that due to the contradictions between the states, lack of 
flexibility in the mechanisms of coordination and relatively low effectiveness of very 
expensive armies, the security of the GCC members and the region is not as solid as the 
GCC planned. The purpose of maintaining regional security solely by means of the GCC 
has not been reached yet.  
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Chapter 1: The GCC as a Regional Security Guarantor: Appearance 
and Development of the Idea 
In this chapter we will try to understand what caused the Gulf countries to start their 
integration process and will analyze its development until today. While the GCC is often 
related to as an economic union – which is also correct because the countries of the Gulf 
made considerable progress along this path during the 21st century –such a characterization 
actually represents only one dimension of its nature. Moreover, the most of the GCC 
development in this dimension is rather recent. Even though at the moment of 
establishment the GCC was officially proclaimed to be an economic entity and in its 
Charter, you cannot find a single word about military cooperation, it seems clear that 
security reasons were the primary catalyst that pushed the six countries to form the union.10 
The most important among these reasons were:  
- Retreat of Great Britain’s military power from the region, which was completed 
and created a military and security vacuum in 1971. Even though the US would 
soon fill this “emptiness,” for some time there was no guarantor of the existing 
order; 
- When the US became the dominating power in the region, it chose a Shia country 
with strong regional ambitions, Iran, to represent its interests, which led to a strong 
dissatisfaction among the Gulf monarchies; 
- After the Iranian Revolution (1979), the US lost control over one of the largest 
regional military powers, whose rhetoric became increasingly aggressive and 
hostile towards the Gulf states. The threats of the Islamic Republic were not empty. 
                                                 




In the year 1981, Bahraini intelligence reportedly uncovered a plot against the Emir 
of Bahrain and as a result 73 Shiites with ties to Iran were convicted.11  
- The tensions between two global superpowers of the time – the US and USSR – 
and their will to take control of the region posed a danger of the Gulf countries 
losing political and economic independence.  
- War between the two main regional military powers – Iran and Iraq – which broke 
out in 1980 formed a direct threat to the independence and security of the Gulf 
monarchies.12 
All these factors intensified negotiations touching upon integration and cooperation 
between the Gulf monarchies. There were several projects proposed and each of them was 
considered and discussed by the future GCC members. Even though these proposals were 
declined, many ideas mentioned in them influenced the final agreement and future GCC 
development:  
• Saudi Arabia proposed to boost military power in the Gulf by conducting a 
series of bilateral agreements providing military cooperation and 
development. As a result, there would be no unity, but ultimately every 
state’s military capability would increase significantly.  
• Oman’s proposal was rather modest and cautious – to organize joint 
protection of the Hormuz strait, as it represents an extremely important but 
vulnerable strategic object; 
• Bahrain’s proposal was theoretically close to the final result, and reflected 
the idea of future Gulf security, even though it was not officially accepted. 
                                                 
11 Glenn P. Kuffel, The Gulf Cooperation Council’s Peninsular Shield Force, (Report, Naval War College, 
2000), 3 
12 Bandar Salman Mohammed Al-Saud, The GCC Security Convention: A Legal And Practical Analysis, 
PhD diss., (University of Glasgow, 1997), 16 
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Its main point was to create a joint military force capable of reacting quickly 
in case of any external threat. 
However, at last the countries officially adopted the Kuwaiti proposal – forming an 
integrated union concentrating on economic, cultural and industrial cooperation.13 Why did 
they choose this form of cooperation, even though it seems least responsive to their real 
goals of creating a joint effort to maintain regional security? The reasons behind this 
decision are actually clear: the countries did not want to concern Iran and Iraq with their 
growing regional ambitions. Yet even though some steps in the direction of economic 
integration were made in the 20th century, no groundbreaking progress was reached.  
At the same time, the implementation of a military cooperation concept – even 
though this idea did not appear in the Charter – started to develop. Before the establishment 
of any military entity was announced, the countries conducted two military training 
exercises in 1981 and 1984. These trainings were respectively named “Peninsula Shield I” 
and “Peninsula Shield II”.14 Later, while the Iran-Iraq war continued, the experience of 
these training exercise and the levels of cooperation reached allowed the GCC states to 
establish a joint military entity which represented the whole idea of the Council’s joint 
military effort – the Peninsula Shield Force. 
DOCTRINE, STRUCTURE, AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE PENINSULA SHIELD FORCE (PSF) 
BEFORE THE GULF WAR 
Conducting the 1984 joint “Peninsula Shield II” training exercise boosted 
integration negotiations and brought the PSF into existence. During the 5th GCC summit 
in Al-Kuwait the countries agreed to establish a military force united by joint command. 
At that period of time, the “symbolic” character of these forces was emphasized, and it was 
                                                 
13 Al-Saud, The GCC Security Convention: A Legal And Practical Analysis, 18 
14 Kuffel, The Gulf Cooperation Council’s Peninsular Shield Force, 4 
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also mentioned that the joint command would become just a temporary element, 
established for a certain period of time when required and disassembled again when not 
needed anymore. According to the final conference statement, these joint contingents were 
to be used “for protection of any other Gulf country together with its own military powers.” 
It is very important to understand that at the time the PSF was not designed to be the main 
regional power in a defensive war of any GCC member. The PSF would only assist the 
army of the country facing aggression.15 The reasons for the countries’ unwillingness to 
give up a larger part of their military sovereignty was based – as it remains until now – on 
a considerable level of political mistrust and different understanding of national interests. 
We will discuss these issues more closely in the following paragraphs. 
 Right after the PSF’s formation, the number of its troops “on the ground” was 
7,000 men housed in Hafr al Batin, Saudi Arabia.16 In addition to the fact that such a 
number of men at arms was explicitly small in comparison with both Iraqi and Iranian 
forces, it represented an expeditionary land force and did not include naval or air forces. 
Theoretically though, this number of soldiers could be increased in case of external 
aggression. Until then, the mobilization plan and structure existed only “on paper” and 
mentioned the required number of troops any country was to send (see Table 1.1) 
According to such a strategy, in the time of war the GCC could deploy a contingent of 
around 10,000 troops. The types of units deployed –infantry, artillery etc. – were discussed 
and reconsidered several times during annual conferences.17 
 
                                                 
15 Elena Melkumyan and Grigory Kosach, “[Совет Сотрудничества Арабских Государств Залива как 
региональная военно-политическая организация]”, “The Gulf Cooperation Council as regional military 
and political organization,” The University of Moscow Herald 25, no. 4 (2012): 47 
16 Mohammed Faisal Alsiri, Gulf Cooperation Council: Arabian Gulf Cooperation Countries Defense 
Forces (Peninsula Shield Force), School of Advanced Military Studies (United States Army Command and 
General Staff College), January 2015, 29 
17 Kuffel, The Gulf Cooperation Council’s Peninsular Shield Force, 10 
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Table 1.1. The PSF Mobilization Structure of 1986 
Saudi Arabia 1 Brigade 
Kuwait 1 Battalion 
Qatar 1 Company 
UAE 1 Battalion 
Bahrain 1 Company 
Oman 1 Company 
Table 1.1: The Gulf Cooperation Council’s Peninsular Shield Force. Source: Kuffel, 
Glenn P. (Report, Naval War College, 2000)  
 
The PSF chain of command had several shortcomings as well. Considering the 
modest size of the forces, the command structure itself was rather simple. At the top of it 
stood a Commanding General (always Saudi, as Saudi Arabia contributes most troops to 
the organization), then Deputy Commanding General (the position rotating between the 
other five members’ officers) and below them – the commanders of Administrative, Intel, 
Ops, Logistics and Plans divisions. After Kuwaiti conflict, GCC Naval Liaison Officer and 
GCC Air Force Liaison Officer completed the chain. This structure is far from being ideal 
simply because the Commanding General always has to be a Saudi. This means that in case 
of conflict he would be responsible for both lives of all the other GCC soldiers and their 
countries’ interests. This situation is further complicated as the activation of the PSF 
requires unanimous approval of the GCC Supreme Council (the rulers of all the six states) 
which significantly reduces flexibility of the organization and its capability to address the 
external aggression quickly (Figure 1.1).18  
                                                 
18 Alsiri, Gulf Cooperation Council: Arabian Gulf Cooperation Countries Defense Forces (Peninsula 




Figure 1.1: The Gulf Cooperation Council’s Peninsular Shield Force. Source: Kuffel, 
Glenn P. (Report, Naval War College, 2000)  
 
These shortcomings of the PSF organization became obvious at the very beginning. 
However, due to the considerable mistrust between the GCC members and their reluctance 
to delegate some of their military power to a supranational institution, further attempts to 
improve the structure were slowed down or paralyzed completely. Alternatively, the 
countries tried to boost their military capabilities by signing bilateral agreements between 
Saudi Arabia and every other member state apart from Kuwait which declined the offer 
“due to constitutional reasons.”19 
 
THE POST-WAR DEVELOPMENT OF THE PSF  
The Gulf War demonstrated an extremely deficient performance of the PSF. Even 
though the countries managed to overcome their political disputes and jointly condemned 
Iraqi aggression after the invasion, they could not do anything to prevent Kuwait from 
being overrun by Iraqi forces. In the foo, during the liberation of Kuwait, 3000 of the PSF 
                                                 
19 Melkumyan, “The Gulf Cooperation Council as regional military and political organization,” 40 
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troops joined the forces of the coalition, but of course did not play a major role during the 
operation.20 In this war, all of the PSF structural inconsistencies and weaknesses became 
obvious and proved that the “symbolic” PSF has little value in guaranteeing regional 
security. 
 The member states understood that and new proposals to improve the PSF structure 
were made thereafter. In 1991, shortly in the aftermath of the conflict, the GCC conducted 
a conference between their Chiefs of Staff in Muscat. During this meeting, the Omani side 
highlighted the ineffectiveness of the PSF and proposed to turn it into an independent 
supranational institute. This “renovated” PSF would consist of not less than 100,000 troops 
and its command would be formed on a rotational basis from the officers of the GCC 
member states.21 In addition to it, in 1997 it was reported that the members agreed to rotate 
the position of Commanding General among all the six member states.22 However, the 
contradictions and lack of trust between the members did not disappear after the Kuwaiti 
war, so both of these relatively decisive and potentially effective initiatives did not bear 
any fruit after becoming declined.  
The PSF continued to develop slowly during the following decades. In the years 
1995 and 2001 the GCC claimed to establish two anti-air systems inside the PSF framework 
– “The Peace Shield” and “Cooperation Belt.” The established systems use American 
“AWACS” radars and American anti-air missiles.23 In addition, in 2002 it was decided to 
increase the armed personnel number, and by 2012 it reached 40,000.24 Still, these 
                                                 




21 Melkumyan, “The Gulf Cooperation Council as regional military and political organization,” 47 
22 Alsiri, Gulf Cooperation Council: Arabian Gulf Cooperation Countries Defense Forces (Peninsula 
Shield Force), 30-31 
23 Melkumyan, “The Gulf Cooperation Council as regional military and political organization,” 48 
24Al-Jabri, Gulf Security: Peninsula Shield Force and Iran, March 15, 2017.  
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improvements did not solve the basic problems which are lack of flexibility and 
coordination, inconsistencies inside the structure and dependence on the assistance of the 
national armies’ naval and air forces. The arms supplies for the PSF do not follow any joint 
pattern, as the organization lacks any military doctrine, so in case of actual warfare the 
maintenance of supply lines could become problematic. 
For these reasons, the PSF has only been used two times since the Gulf War. The 
first case was a “passive,” non-warfare event, as it only included deploying the PSF force 
into Kuwait in 2003 in order to prevent “the potential Iraqi threat,” which did not appear 
after all. The second time the PSF was used to assist Bahrain in suppressing its 2011 
demonstrations. The “warfare” against hardly armed demonstrators could not be called a 
serious test for an organization crafted to protect regional security against such threats as 
Iran or any other considerable military power.25 At the same time, during the biggest and 
arguably the most important GCC military operation since its establishment – intervention 
in Yemen – the PSF could not be deployed due to Oman’s declination to participate, which 
again raised questions about the effectiveness of the Force in its present form.  
 
THE GCC DIVIDED: MAIN CONTRADICTIONS AND QATARI CRISIS 
The previous chapter stated considerable doubts about the PSF as an effective 
regional security guarantor. In it, I have mentioned multiple contradictions and conflicts of 
interests between the GCC members. One of the most basic and primary functions of 
armies – at least in the states where the army and the government represent separate 
institutions – is usually to assure that the state will remain independent and conduct its 




25 Melkumyan, “The Gulf Cooperation Council as regional military and political organization,” 48 
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independent policies, not fearing the interference of a foreign power. Subsequently, if the 
countries’ interests do not fall together, military coordination perspectives become 
doubtful, for a joint military force cannot represent different or conflicting interests. What 
are these contradictions? Of course, partly they lie in the military sphere: differences in the 
views upon the military development, different military doctrines and capacities, different 
ideas of military spending importance etc. But actually such issues have plagued the GCC 
from the very beginning in every sphere of cooperation: economic, trade, cultural, military, 
social etc.  
First of all, when analyzing today’s integration processes within economic entities 
around the world (European Union, NAFTA, GAFTA and others), we inevitably stumble 
upon the countries’ unwillingness to share political/economic/military power and their fear 
to lose it, damaging their own interests. This unwillingness does not allow the European 
Union to continue its, until now, very successful path to a united state, and it also has ruined 
the effectiveness of many Arab League activities. This factor becomes even more serious 
in cases when there are those enjoying undisputed economic, territorial or military 
dominance among integreated countries. In such a situation, the danger always exists that 
transferring some part (or all of it) of economic and political power and responsibilities to 
the supra-national institutions will serve not the joint interests of an integrational unity but 
benefit of a prevailing country. For instance, in the European Union there are two countries 
which de facto are the leaders of the unity and which play the major role in its internal and 
external policies: Germany and France. Of course, in the case of Europe the mistrust among 
the leaders and the other countries is significantly less than in the other instances (one of 
them is the example of the failure of the AMU, where the ambitions of Kaddafi’s Libya 
played a huge role in the destruction of the Arab Maghreb Union). But even in today’s 
Europe, with the rise of Euroscepticism, the voices claiming that Germany and France 
15 
 
represent danger to sovereignty of the other, less developed or just poorer countries, are 
growing stronger.26  
In the GCC case, Saudi Arabia is the superior country. Economically, the GDP of 
Saudi Arabia – even after the start of the oil crisis (2014) – exceeds the combined GDP of 
its two main pursuers: the UAE and Qatar (Figure 2.1).27 The population of the country 
exceeds all the rest of the GCC combined and territorially it occupies more than 83% of 
the GCC total geographic area. In addition, for a long time Saudi Arabia has remained the 
main USA ally in the region, and it does not hesitate to use its capabilities to spread its 
influence around the world, even if the manner of these actions becomes rather aggressive. 
Suspicion regarding true Saudi intentions crawls into every sphere of cooperation. It led to 
multiple delays in economic integration and alterations in the plans of transferring 
economic responsibilities to supra-national institutes. As of today, it seems that such 
suspicions have finally brought down the plans of forming the Gulf Monetary Union. These 
plans which have already been discussed for almost twenty years did not lead to any results. 
In the year 2008, when the Monetary Council was established, and a Saudi minister chosen 
for the director’s seat, the UAE declined to accept voting results which declared the 
headquarters of the new organ were to be placed in Riyadh and not Abu-Dhabi.28  
                                                 
26 Stuart Jeffries, “Is Germany Too Powerful for Europe?,” the Guardian, March 31, 2013, 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/mar/31/is-germany-too-powerful-for-europe & Brendan Simms, 
“Germany’s triumph: from the ruins of war, how a new European empire was built,” The New Statesman, 
July 30, 2015, https://www.newstatesman.com/politics/2015/07/germany-s-triumph-ruins-war-how-new-
european-empire-was-built & Richard Palmer, “Greece to Remain a European Colony Until 2060,” The 
Trumpet, February 27, 2017, https://www.thetrumpet.com/16984-greece-to-remain-a-european-colony-
until-2060 
27 “GCC countries by GDP (2016),” 
http://investingroup.org/data/65/gcc-countries-by-gdp-2016/ 
28 Nour Malas, Maria Abi-Habib and Tahani Karrar, “U.A.E. Quits Gulf Monetary Union,” The Wall Street 




Figure 2.1: GCC countries by GDP (2016) 
 
The potential of integration seems even more doubtful in light of growing ambitions 
of two states: UAE and Qatar. Evident in Figure 2.1, the UAE and Qatar follow Saudi 
Arabia according to GDP. In addition to that, throughout the past two decades, the UAE 
has made significant progress in diversifying its industries and today the country possesses 
a much more flexible economy than Saudi Arabia. Another important aspect is that the 
financial reserves of UAE and Qatar exceed those of Saudi Arabia, which is becoming 
more and more important today as oil prices continue to fall. These factors increase the 
economic importance of these states (especially of the UAE, the economic power of which 
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depends much less on the hydrocarbon exports) and their desire to conduct independent 
policies.29  
 
However, Bahrain and Oman have also played roles in undermining integration 
processes. In 2004 and 2008, Bahrain and Oman signed agreements with the USA 
according to which free trade zones were established between the US and each of these 
countries separately.30 Now such negotiations are continuing with Qatar and the UAE. 
These agreements undermine the whole idea of the GCC customs union as long as the 
goods entering one country duty-free will not face any customs when entering another state 
of the union, even though that state does not have an agreement with the third side (the 
US). However, only Saudi Arabia implemented sanctions towards Bahrain in 2004, 
restricting imports from the country. 
The described tendencies clearly show that the smaller countries of the Gulf feel 
more concerned about their own interests than the success and development of the 
integration. Moreover, it seems obvious that in many cases the GCC countries do not 
consider further integration as a means to accomplish these interests. If so, due to the failure 
of civilian integration, military integration will inevitably stagnate unless a very deep and 
existential outside threat appears in the region. Not so long ago Iran could have represented 
such a threat, but recently its role has become much more ambiguous. In 2017, the situation 
in the region changed dramatically, moving the GCC from stagnating military cooperation 
to the verge of military confrontation inside the GCC. Of course, I am writing about the 
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conflict between Qatar and other five members of the GCC, which has already changed the 
alignment of forces in the Gulf. 
QATARI CRISIS AND THE REASONS BEHIND IT 
 The current crisis has deep roots going into the 20th century. Since the 1970s, when 
all the Gulf countries finally gained independence, the region experienced multiple and 
sometimes rather aggressive territorial disputes between the member states. One of the 
longest and furious episodes happened between Qatar and Saudi Arabia. It lasted from 
1974 until 1999, and the disputed territory was the Al-Hufus area, which represented the 
only land segment between Qatar and the UAE, and therefore became extremely important 
for trade. The dispute was solved in favor of Saudi Arabia, but it definitely left a mark on 
the history of the two countries’ relations. Some scholars even suggest that Saudi Arabia, 
in order to resolve this issue the way the government wanted, was involved in the coup 
overthrowing the Emir of Qatar.31 However, I find this claim doubtful as it was actually 
the Emir’s son, Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, who moved the political vector of his country 
out of Saudi “waterway.” This became possible because in the beginning of the 1990s, 
Qatar started diversifying its exports by introducing LNG (liquefied natural gas) 
technology. Since then, the exports of this fuel have grown rapidly. Qatar has continued to 
increase its LNG exports since then, which allowed this relatively small country to increase 
its GDP from $8.1bn in the year 1995 to an impressive $210bn in 2014.32 
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With such tremendous economic growth, political ambitions came – together with 
the will to stop following Saudi leads in international issues. Al-Jazeera channel, founded 
in 1996, became one of the most important means of realizing these ambitions. Since its 
inception, the channel has been very unpopular with Saudi and several other ruling families 
of the Gulf. Throughout the first decade of the 21st century, Al-Jazeera repeatedly reported 
on bans and blocked broadcasts in several countries, including Saudi Arabia.33 The channel 
has become an impactful source of Qatari anti-Saudi propaganda. Since the date of its 
establishment, several channels have been launched to lessen its impact. Al-Arabiya, 
Dubai-based and Saudi-funded, has become the most successful project in this sense.  
Still, these projects were not successful enough – and Al-Jazeera remained the best-
watched Arabic news channel with viewer ratings exceeding 53% in 2014. This result 
exceeded the next four followers’ results combined, including the one of Al-Arabiya.34 
That allowed Al-Jazeera to play a special role during the Arab Spring in 2011. As the 
revolutionary movements appeared in several Arab countries, including Tunisia, Syria, 
Egypt and others, Al-Jazeera started to support the anti-governmental organizations, both 
pro-democratic and Islamic (for instance, Muslim Brotherhood), while Saudi Arabia 
concentrated on supporting the existing regimes for the sake of maintaining and increasing 
its influence. The aim of Saudi Arabia was to avoid instability in the region, and especially 
in the monarchies (such as Morocco and Jordan) out of fear that the unrest would spread to 
the Kingdom’s territory. In the year 2011, Saudi Arabia allocated $5bn to both Jordan and 
Morocco, and lifted the long-standing barriers to its own fruit markets to support the 
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regimes financially.35 At the same time, Al-Jazeera’s coverage of the protests in these two 
countries remained very pro-opposition.36 The only Arab Spring protest which was not 
sufficiently covered by the channel remained the Bahraini demonstrations, where Qatar did 
not risk of opposing the GCC directly.37 Nevertheless, after the diplomatic crisis had 
broken out, shutting Al-Jazeera down became one of the first demands of the opposing 
GCC countries.38  
However, Al-Jazeera was not the only means for Qatar to spread its influence and 
throw sand into Saudi wheels. Qatar was repeatedly accused of supporting different, more 
or less radical, Islamic groups. Multiple sources claim close relations of the country with 
Al-Qaeda, but the evidence is rather unclear.39 It has also shown a significant support for 
the Tunisian revolutionary government: similar to the post-Spring Saudi support of 
Morocco and Jordan, Qatar helped the Tunisian regime both financially and with resources. 
Especially noteworthy was an announcement in May 2012 of Qatari plans to construct a 
refinery on Tunisia’s Gulf of Gabes coast at La Skhira with an output of 120,000 barrels 
per day. The $2 billion project would allow Tunisia to refine oil from neighboring Libya 
and develop its potential as an export hub for refined products, massively expanding 
capacity beyond the aging 35,000 bar/d Bizerte refinery.40 But the closest ties were built 
with the Muslim Brotherhood, the movement responsible for a huge part of the Arab Spring 
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uprisings and which came to power in Egypt (even though for a rather short time). These 
ties went back to the 1950s, when Egyptian members of the movement, seeking refuge 
from prosecution, found it in Qatar (since then, Qatar has gained an ambivalent reputation 
for extremist-asylum, providing refuge for many other prosecuted radicals). These ties have 
never disappeared. As a result, when the Arab Spring broke out, Qatar had every possibility 
to influence the demonstrations and protests. And if the supported groups came to power – 
Qatar helped them financially, with resources and by any other means in order to establish 
the regimes depending on their money, and potentially opposed to Saudi Arabia. On a visit 
to Cairo in September 2012, Hamad bin Jassim announced that Qatar would invest a total 
of $18 billion in Egypt over five years. Commenting that there would be “no limits” to 
Qatar’s support, the Qatari prime minister stated that $8 billion would be invested in an 
integrated power plant, natural gas, and iron steel project in Port Said, while the remaining 
$10 billion would finance the construction of a tourism marina complex on the 
Mediterranean coastline.41 However, Qatar lost this gamble, as the counter-revolutionary 
As-Sisi regime was supported by Saudi Arabia and overthrew pro-Qatari Mursi. 
In addition to these points, one should mention that Qatari-Iranian relations have 
always been warmer than they “should,” according to the joint GCC position led by Saudi 
Arabia. Even though Qatar joined the international sanctions against Iran from 2010 to 
2016, and no Qatari entity – according to the US information – has violated the sanctions 
regime, the country continued to enjoy some friendly ties with the GCC rival.42 Qatari 
leaders have always followed the position that only a constructive dialogue would lead to 
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the resolution of the GCC-Iranian tensions. Such a position seems rather understandable. 
Qatar and Iran share the largest gas field in the world, which is the North Dome field.43 A 
sea border splits the field in two parts – Bahraini and Iranian – but, unlike the border issue 
with Saudi Arabia, the demarcation went smoothly and almost without tensions, and was 
finished in the year 1969. Further on, when sanctions were enacted against Iran, Qatar 
offered its help in developing the Northern part of the field. The reason behind this was 
that Qatar feared Iran might try to boost gas production after the implementation of 
sanctions (Iran had previously struggled with increasing the output), which would put the 
whole field in danger.44 However, this gesture could be still counted as a friendly one, as 
long as Qatar could have chosen a much more ultimate position towards weakened and 
isolated Iran. Intentions to improve relations between the two countries proved to be true 
in 2013, when Hassan Rouhani was elected president in Iran, and further cooperation in 
the field development followed. This policy of avoiding “burned bridges” determined the 
rapid development of relations between Qatar and Iran after the crisis outbreak. 
CRISIS AND ITS AFTERMATH 
The previous part of this Chapter gives us enough information to understand that 
any events directly preceding the outbreak of the crisis determined it in the same manner 
as the assassination of Franz Ferdinand determined the beginning of the World War I. 
Obviously, the conflict between Qatar and the rest of the GCC happened predictably and 
logically, as it was fueled by years and decades of economic and political discrepancies, 
bilateral suspicion, hidden and sometimes almost open acts of hostility etc. The hacking 
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incident of the UAE ambassador emails (according to them, he had ties to a pro-Israeli 
American think-tank), as well as the following hacking of Al-Jazeera (when its site 
allegedly distributed fake Qatari emir's statements) became merely an occasion to start the 
confrontation.  
June 5, 2017, four countries - Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, the UAE and Egypt cut their 
relations with Qatar and put the start to what is sometimes called in the media the "Siege 
of Qatar"45. Later on, Jordan also announced a scale-down in its diplomatic ties with Qatar 
and shut down the Al-Jazeera bureau in Amman. As you can see, both Egypt and Jordan, 
where Qatar tried to support the opposition but failed to overpower Saudi influence, 
supported the measures against it. While Kuwait and Oman did not join the siege and 
claimed to become "the mediators" to resolve the conflict peacefully, one should 
understand that neither of these countries possesses enough weight to influence Saudi 
Arabia and the UAE in the GCC. Soon after severing relations, a list of 13 conditions for 
Qatar to fulfill was published by the states implementing the siege. Here are the conditions: 
— Curb diplomatic ties with Iran and close its diplomatic missions there. Expel members 
of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard from Qatar and cut off any joint military cooperation with 
Iran. Only trade and commerce with Iran that complies with U.S. and international 
sanctions will be permitted; 
— Sever all ties to “terrorist organizations,” specifically the Muslim Brotherhood, the 
Islamic State group, al-Qaida, and Lebanon’s Hezbollah. Formally declare those entities as 
terrorist groups; 
— Shut down Al-Jazeera and its affiliate stations; 
— Shut down news outlets that Qatar funds, directly and indirectly, including Arabi21, 
                                                 




Rassd, Al Araby Al-Jadeed and Middle East Eye; 
— Immediately terminate the Turkish military presence currently in Qatar and end any 
joint military cooperation with Turkey inside of Qatar; 
— Stop all means of funding for individuals, groups or organizations that have been 
designated as terrorists by Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt, Bahrain, the United States and 
other countries; 
— Hand over “terrorist figures” and wanted individuals from Saudi Arabia, the UAE, 
Egypt and Bahrain to their countries of origin. Freeze their assets, and provide any desired 
information about their residency, movements and finances; 
— End interference in sovereign countries’ internal affairs. Stop granting citizenship to 
wanted nationals from Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt and Bahrain. Revoke Qatari 
citizenship for existing nationals where such citizenship violates those countries’ laws; 
— Stop all contacts with the political opposition in Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt and 
Bahrain. Hand over all files detailing Qatar’s prior contacts with and support for those 
opposition groups; 
— Pay reparations and compensation for loss of life and other, financial losses caused by 
Qatar’s policies in recent years. The sum will be determined in coordination with Qatar; 
— Align itself with the other Gulf and Arab countries militarily, politically, socially and 
economically, as well as on economic matters, in line with an agreement reached with 
Saudi Arabia in 2014; 
— Agree to all the demands within 10 days of it being submitted to Qatar, or the list 
becomes invalid. The document doesn’t specify what the countries will do if Qatar refuses 
to comply; 
— Consent to monthly audits for the first year after agreeing to the demands, then once per 
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quarter during the second year. For the following 10 years, Qatar would be monitored 
annually for compliance.46 
As one may see, these demands fit perfectly well into the picture described in the 
previous part of the chapter. If the demanding countries reach success, these measures will 
cut all the ways of Qatari influence both in the region and internationally. Al-Jazeera, in 
such a case, would stop spreading Qatari agenda, deportation of rebellious extremists 
would worsen the relations with radical organizations abroad and monitoring would assure 
that those contracts wouldn’t renew. In addition, stopping the cooperation with Turkey and 
Iran would make Qatar extremely dependent on the GCC states – the UAE and Saudi 
Arabia – and deprive it of any support in case of pressure from their side. So, this list 
represents an ultimatum telling Qatar that its hostile policies will not be accepted anymore.  
In today’s political and economic situation in the Middle East it seems unlikely that 
the sieging countries really believe those conditions would be fulfilled. In the time of oil 
crisis, when all of the countries’ economies are meeting severe hardships and the political 
atmosphere becomes more and more heated due to wars in Iraq, Syria and Yemen, unrest 
in Lebanon and chaos in Libya, it would seem logical for the GCC to try finding common 
ground for a diplomatic resolution to their differences in order to protect the Gulf from 
unrest. But with the passage of time it becomes more and more apparent that the sieging 
countries are not ready for a compromise. Even more – it might turn out that Qatar also 
does not believe in such compromise. The sieging coalition position remains extreme. On 
the third of March, 2018, UAE Minister of Foreign Affairs Gargash claimed that “If [the 
Qataris] steer clear from desperate actions and stop beating around the bush, their 
                                                 




remaining options are clear. [They must] stop inflicting harm or accept isolation.”47 
Throughout almost a year of confrontation, the sieging states never stopped accusing Qatar 
of supporting terrorism and damaging the regional security.48 Meantime, the Qatari 
position remains (at least officially) open to dialogue, but firm and not receptive to the 
ultimatum. On July, 27, Qatar's foreign minister said the list had stipulations that couldn't 
be met and was "made to be rejected."49  
Even though formally Qatar continues to accept Kuwaiti and Omani mediation, 
stress its readiness to negotiate and unwillingness to further escalate the conflict, the 
country has chosen to follow the old wisdom and not to let their probable desire of peace 
interfere with preparing to war. So far, the country has been tightening its relations with 
the non-GCC powerful actors. The first and the most obvious examples are Turkey and 
Iran. Almost since the very beginning of the conflict Qatar reported via Al-Jazeera that 
both countries “stand by” Qatar in the developing crisis.50 While the intentions of Turkey 
and Iran cannot be clearly estimated, gestures of friendship as well as some amount of 
support are obvious.  
Qatar represents a country mostly covered by desert, so most of the food – 
especially after modernization, an increase in the quality of life and population growth – 
has been imported. Figure 3.1 shows that in pre-crisis 2015, 49% of all food products were 
imported from the GCC member states. For instance, the major part of milk and poultry 
came via Saudi Arabia, while Qatari milk production covered only around 15% of total 
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consumption, and the overall food product output reached only 7.2% of consumption.51 
After the borders were shut down, thousands of trucks were stopped by the guards, unable 
to cross the barrier dividing the countries.52 Overnight, the food security of the country 
became a very important and urgent concern. Turkey used that chance to immediately show 
their support for Qatar and in less than 48 hours after the outburst of the crisis Turkey sent 
cargo deliveries with milk and poultry to Qatari shores. During the four following months, 
according to Turkey’s exporting association, the country increased its exports by 90%.53 
Iran took the same steps in supporting Qatari food security. Soon after the borders’ 
shutdown, it started to export food via planes and as early as June, 11, more than 100 tons 
of fruits and vegetables came to Qatar by air.54  
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In addition to diplomatic and economic ties Qatar decided to “diversify” its military 
cooperation. As already mentioned, military cooperation between Qatar and Turkey began 
before the siege, and long-standing rumors about military ties with Iran were never 
confirmed by trustworthy sources. On the 7th of June, immediately after the crisis outbreak, 
Turkey's parliament ratified two earlier deals – one of them allowing Turkish troops to be 
deployed in Qatar, and another approving an accord between the two countries on military 
training cooperation.55 The sides have also announced plans to increase the number of 
Turkish military personnel on the territory of Qatar up to 3,000 men and women. If the 
                                                 




plan is implemented, this Turkish contingent will become a considerable force. For 
comparison, the pre-crisis PSF personnel counted around 30,000 men and women.56  
As for the claims of military cooperation between Iran and Qatar, there is no clear 
evidence that it exists. Several sources claim that as early as 2015, the two countries signed 
a treaty named “Fighting terrorism and addressing the elements that undermine security in 
the region.”57 They trace it to multiple diplomatic contacts between Iran and Qatar and 
blame Qatar for thinking of Iran as a measure to fight Gulf threats, while actually Iran is 
one of these threats. However, most of the information about such activities come from Al-
Arabiya channel and other Arab channels which could probably just reproduce Al-Arabiya 
news or be influenced by Saudi Arabiya as well. On the one hand, lack of such evidence 
could make us suppose that these alleged ties are just an instrument of propaganda against 
Qatar. On the other hand, it does not make sense that the sieging coalition put “cutting off 
any joint military cooperation with Iran” at the very beginning of the demands list. But in 
any case, the recent visit of Iranian foreign minister to Qatar and the official full restoring 
of diplomatic relationships between the states definitely serves as a sign of gradual 
cooperation development.58 
The ongoing military conflict between Qatar and the GCC poses a serious threat 
towards the future of the entity. It not only makes the progress along the vector of 
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deepening military cooperation and integration stagnate – this conflict is weakening the 
entity and poses a threat to regional security itself. As long as the GCC military union 
seems more and more fragile, its members should rely on their own forces for the sake of 





Chapter 2: Military Characteristics of the GCC states (2011 until now) 
The previous chapters of the thesis gave the reader a clear idea that, due to the 
contradictions within the GCC, the concept of providing regional security by means of joint 
effort and through the PSF structures did not work in the past and seems more and more 
doubtful today and in the future. However, in order to estimate the capability of the GCC 
in securing their territory and sovereignty we will need to analyze military capability of 
every state. This chapter will examine the overall condition of every state’s army and try 
to understand, how each of these countries sees the purpose of defending itself. The 
analysis will be based on Figures 4.1, 4.2 and Table 2.1 (arms transfers in the years 2011-
2018, with and without Saudi Arabia), Table 2.2 (relation of military expenditure to GDP) 
and Table 3.1 (military expenditure in 2016-2017). All of the mentioned figures and tables 
are presented at the end of this chapter, apart from Table 3.1 which you may find in 
Appendix.. 
BAHRAIN 
 Bahrain represents the smallest country in the GCC, with the smallest gross 
military expenditure. Even though its military expenditure/GDP ratio is not the lowest one 
(during the period 2011-2017, it was volatile and changed between 3.63% and 4.94%), the 
country does not represent a considerable military power in the Gulf. Just as in the 
economic sphere, where due to the insignificant oil reserves the country depends on 
financial support of other GCC members, in the military sphere Bahrain will most likely 
delegate protection of its sovereignty to other states, first of all – to Saudi Arabia. This was 
exactly the case in 2011, when the PSF forces were used to prevent the alleged “internal 
threat” – people’s demonstrations in the country.  
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Even though Bahrain’s army is the smallest in the Gulf (6,000) people, according 
to the Military Balance annual report journal, it is well equipped and trained.59 Even though 
Bahrain cannot play any decisive role in any warfare due to the small size of its military, 
its Air Force took part in Yemeni Civil war on the side of Saudi-led coalition and fought 
against ISIS in Syria.  
The arms purchased are generally defensive: armored protected vehicles (Turkish 
“Cobra”), anti-tank missiles (Russian “Kornets”), combat ac radars and others. Most of the 
arms come from the US, but Bahrain tries to diversify its imports, buying arms from other 
NATO members (France, Turkey, UK etc.) and from non-NATO countries like Russia and 
China. The country almost did not react to the oil crisis, Qatari crisis and coalition 
intervention to Yemen: the military budget remained stable during the 2011-2017 period, 
even though its share of GDP changed slightly due to the GDP volatility.  
KUWAIT 
Kuwait is the third smallest country of the GCC. Even though its army size is almost 
twice as large as Bahrain’s – 11,000 soldiers + more than 20,000 in reserve – Military 
Balance report considers the task of resisting foreign aggression with such an army size on 
a small territory extremely problematic.60 Even though Kuwait increased arms imports 
significantly after Iraqi aggression, the country’s geographic and demographic situation 
makes it rely on its stronger neighbors and friendly countries in a potential conflict.  
 This probably determines the fact that Kuwaiti military expenditure to GDP ratio 
changed only slightly until the years 2015 and 2016. As this time correlates with the 
beginning of the coalition military intervention into Yemen, we may conclude that the 
                                                 
59 Military Balance (2018), Chapter Seven: Middle East and North Africa, 2018. DOI: 
10.1080/04597222.2018.1416983, 327 
60 Ibid, 345 
33 
 
country – even though it did not play any decisive role in the conflict – decided to 
strengthen its military concerning this task. Change of this ratio could be also partly 
explained by falling oil prices – especially in the year 2015, when gross Kuwaiti military 
expenditure slightly fell. But the next year gross military expenditure increased over the 
2014 level, so I find the influence of war very probable.  
The structure of arms transfer also supports this theory. The thing is, since 2016 
Kuwaiti contracts have been aimed generally at renovating and strengthening its aviation. 
For instance, the country has signed or is going to sign the contracts for 28 Typhoon Block-
20 fighter jets (Italy), 30 Super Cougar tactical helicopters (France), 28 F/A-18E Super 
Hornet fighter jets (US) and other types of aircraft. The arms for these jets include JDAM 
guided bombs (US), AAQ-33 Sniper targeting pods (US), Brimstone missiles (UK) and 
other types of arms. For now, the Kuwaiti Air Force consists primarily of F/A-18C/D 
Hornet jets. Unlike other GCC countries, Kuwait does not purchase a lot of defensive arms, 
which – again – means that the country counts on the assistance of its allies in protecting 
its territory.  
OMAN 
Even though Oman does not have an international image of a militant country – it 
was the only GCC country which refused to join Saudi coalition in Yemen – its military 
expenditure to GDP ratio has remained the largest in the world for several years (Saudi 
Arabia usually occupies second place).61 In 2016 this number reached a stunning 16.4% of 
the GDP. One should keep in mind though that the military expenditure/GDP ratio in the 
case of Oman is much more volatile than gross military expenditure. For instance, this more 
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than 4% ratio increase in the year 2016 correlates with just a minor increase in military 
expenditure, so the fall of the GDP during the oil crisis played a major role in the volatility. 
On the other hand, gross military expenditure was rising drastically during 2011 and 2012 
and then did not fall significantly despite the oil crisis. Even amid the oil prices fall, Oman 
decided not to decrease its military expenditure, which means that the country considers its 
capability of self-protection a primary objective.  
For this task Oman keeps an army of 25,000 soldiers. According to the Military 
Balance report, this army is well equipped and trained. The country also possesses a 
relatively strong Air Force which has been recently reinforced by modern Typhoon Block-
20 (UK) jets, and C-295 transport aircraft (Spain). Still, according to the data, Oman 
concentrates on purchasing defensive gear as combat ac radar APG-68 (US), anti-tank 
missile FGM-148 Javelin (US), air-search radar Lanza-LRR (Spain), mobile air-defense 
system Avenger (US) and others. The large emphasis is made on updating Omani military 
jets with the most modern gear and importing enough radars and air-defense systems to 
win air-superiority in case of defensive war.  
Unlike Kuwait or Bahrain, Oman is clearly striving to conduct independent policies 
and self-protection. Such a position allows this country not to follow its stronger allies in 
their conflicts – like, for instance, the Yemeni Civil War. Also, according to the Military 
Balance report, the large part of Omani military expenditure goes to the development of 
infrastructure – for instance, the renovation at the port of Duqum, which is used actively in 
the interests of the US fleet, the major naval power of the Gulf region.62 The country’s 
enormous military expenditure, therefore, serves its will of independence and neutral 
status.  
                                                 




Even though Qatar is one of the two nations which has actively tried to change the 
GCC power balance and position itself as Saudi Arabia’s rival since the beginning of the 
21st century, its military capabilities do not correlate with these ambitions at all. Unlike 
Yemen, Qatar has apparently not been devoting too much attention to military 
development. Its military expenditure increased from $3,45 billion in the year 2011 to 
$5,09 billion in 2014 and then slightly decreased under the influence of the oil crisis. When 
the GDP of the country started to fall, Qatar decided to spend less on its military, and as a 
result the military expenditure/GDP ratio has always been over 2% but never reached 3%. 
Again, in the case of Oman we have seen the contrary situation – but Qatar surely has not 
been betting on its independent military capacity in a potential conflict.  
This decision seems pragmatic. The second smallest country of the GCC with the 
second smallest army of the Council (8,500 soldiers, just 2,500 more than Bahraini army), 
Qatar’s demography and geography would not allow the country to establish an effective 
army even in the case of exponentially increasing military expenditure. In potential 
warfare, Qatar would probably count on its allies – and amid the conflict with the GCC, it 
is actively looking for new ones (the previous chapter has already discussed strengthening 
ties with Iran and Turkey). Apart from this tactic, Qatar is still keeping its small army 
modern and capable: the country purchases a considerable number of defensive arms such 
as MILAN anti-tank missiles (France), Exocet CDS coast defensive systems, Kronos air 
search radars (Italy), FGM-148 Javelin anti-tank missiles and many others. Unsurprisingly, 
many of these contracts date from 2016 to 2017, when the relations of Qatar with the rest 
of the GCC became shaky. Also, when the crisis became inevitable, Qatar decided to boost 
its Air Force and Navy by buying 36 F-15E Strike Eagle fighter jets (US), 12 Rafale fighter 
jets (France), different types of trainee aircraft from diversified suppliers as well as four 
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corvettes, two offshore-patrol vessels and an amphibious platform BDSL (Italy). It has also 
shown interest in Russian C-400 anti-air missile systems.63 In general, Qatar is trying to 
diversify its exports with the main supplies coming from the US, France and other NATO 
members, but also from Russia, Turkey, Pakistan, China and other non-NATO countries.  
The last necessary thing to say about Qatar and its military expenditure and doctrine 
is that throughout the recent years (as described in the previous chapters), the country 
spread and strengthened its influence by means of financing different militant groups, 
indirectly participating in proxy wars and spreading its views by means of Al-Jazeera and 
other media. It was participating in the military activity indirectly, and for this reason this 
was not visible in the military expenditure structure. Unfortunately, the expenditure data 
for 2017 is currently unavailable, so we do not know to what extent the outbreak of crisis 
influenced Qatar’s military budget and doctrine. However, the siege imposed by Saudi 
Arabia and other countries lays a burden on Qatar’s economy and for that reason I consider 
a rapid increase of military spending rather improbable. Also, keeping in mind that 
boosting military requires time, it would not be pragmatic to react to potential aggression 
by signing new contracts. In today’s situation, Qatar will most probably seek protection by 
Turkey, Iran and the US.  
THE UAE 
Just like Qatar, the UAE try to put themselves as an independent military power, 
not wanting to blindly follow the political and military lines of Saudi Arabia. But unlike 
Oman and Qatar, the UAE military plays an important role in reaching this goal. Recently, 
the UAE army (and first of all, the Air Forces) has conducted a number of military 
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operations in the Middle Eastern region. Some of them were coordinated with Saudi 
Arabia, but others probably were not.  
One of the most striking examples of the UAE’s use of its military power was in 
Libya, May 2017, when a satellite captured the image of six US-made military jets on the 
air base of General Haftar’s forces. According to the sources, this deployment represents a 
part of the larger campaign conducted by Russia, Egypt and the UAE. Its main goal is to 
support General Haftar which is currently opposing the UN-backed government of Libya. 
It is still unclear if the US or Saudi Arabia were aware of the UAE’s active participation in 
this conflict.64 In addition to that , the UAE, together with the US, successfully supported 
pro-Hadi Yemeni troops in fighting Al-Qaeda, including liberating Shawba province from 
the influence of this radical organization.65 The UAE has also taken an active part in the 
Yemeni conflict and the war against ISIS. Apart from air and ground operations, the UAE 
diversified its approach to the Yemeni conflict by providing training ground for pro-Hadi 
troops on the Emirati territory near the city of Al-In.66 
This active, and to a certain extent aggressive, foreign policy correlates with the 
UAE military doctrine, which includes: 
- Mobilizing all its human and natural resources, as well as technology, to 
compensate for the country’s moderate size and small population; 
- Building its military and other national security-related infrastructure, including 
cybersecurity; 
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- Seeking strategic depth through overseas military installations and the forward 
deployment of assets and capabilities; 
- Emphasizing the centrality of its strategic alliance with Saudi Arabia; 
- Maintaining close ties with the United States; 
- Engaging with the global economy and many aspects of emerging globalized 
culture; 
- Opposing all forms of radical Islamism; 
- Making a determined effort to limit the expansion of Iranian influence in the Arab 
world; 
- Using “soft power,” such as humanitarian or development aid and investments, at 
times in conjunction with “hard power,” to promote its interests; 
- Maintaining and developing its crucial alliance with GCC member states, other 
Arab countries, and international partners.67 
Unfortunately, the UAE military expenditure has not been announced since 2015, 
the year the Yemeni operation started. However, the most probable reason for this is the 
start of the oil crisis and reluctance to announce a detailed budget in these circumstances. 
Still, from 2011 to 2014. the UAE increased its military expenditure/GDP ratio by almost 
one percent (even though the maximum did not exceed 3.6% of the GDP). At the same 
time, military expenditure absolute value increased significantly: from $9.32 billion in 
2011 to $14.4 billion in 2014. As long as Saudi Arabia’s expenditure demonstrated growth 
during this period of time as well, we may suppose that the aftermath of Arab Spring, which 
played a major role in the development of Yemeni Civil War, made these countries 
reconsider their military capacities and encouraged strengthening and modernizing them.  
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The structure of UAE arms imports suggest the purpose of modernizing and 
strengthening the state’s arsenal was more about offensive than defensive operations. The 
most obvious prove is the purchase of 8600 guided bombs from the US (GBU-39 SDB and 
JDAM). The bombs started to be delivered as early as 2015, so they were probably 
deployed to Yemen and used for bombing ISIS as well. Also, the arsenal was reinforced 
by 24 units of ground-attacking aircraft Archangel-BPA (US), 8 P-1HH Hammerhead 
drones (Italy, though these drones have apparently still not been delivered), 10 RQ-1 
Predator drones (US) and different kinds of armored vehicles and supporting units. Not too 
many defensive arms types were purchased during this period of time. In 2017, the UAE 
is continuing to buy arms capable of supporting its military operations: the country signed 
the contract for delivery of 13640 Paveway guided bombs (US), 160 MIM-104 PATRIOT 
surface-to-air missiles systems (US) and others.  
According to the Military Balance report (2018), today the UAE army is “arguably 
the best trained and most capable among the GCC states.”68 The country is actively trying 
to develop its forces by means of diversified activities, including military cooperation 
agreements with the US. The last such agreement was signed in May, 2017. Finally, the 
UAE is developing its own defense-industrial base in order to reduce its dependence on 
arms imports. For now, it pays attention to such sectors as defense-electronic, guided 
weapons, munitions and support.69According to SIPRI database, some of the arms are 
purchased from foreign countries but assembled on the Emirati territory.  
SAUDI ARABIA 
Even though the UAE army may represent the best trained and capable military 
force of the GCC, Saudi Arabia is definitely the best-equipped and largest one. According 
                                                 
68 Military Balance (2018), 367 
69 Military Balance (2018), 367 
40 
 
to the Military Balance reports, its army size is 75,000 soldiers in addition to 100,000 
National Guard, 3,000 marines and other units. For years Saudi Arabia has remained one 
of the two important powers of the Gulf and the main rival of Iran. The continuing 
confrontation of these two countries determines regional policies to a large extent.  
This confrontation is also visible when analyzing Saudi arms transfers structure. 
Apart from the UAE, Saudi Arabia is the only GCC country which purchases anti-
submarine equipment, for instance, FLASH ASW-sonar (France). This must be a measure 
against the Iranian submarine fleet, for Iran is the only country in the Persian Gulf region 
with one. In general, Saudi Arabia buys both defensive and offensive arms. However, the 
second type prevails due to the Yemen operation and overall lack of regional stability 
during the last few years. The country has purchased thousands of guided bombs (Paveway, 
JDAM and other) from the US and other countries of the West, multiple aircraft, armored 
vehicles, tanks etc. The sources of these kinds of weaponry are rather diversified and 
include Russia, Bulgaria, Canada, Ukraine, China and other countries, but the largest share 
of arms always comes from the US. 
 The military expenditure of Saudi Arabia is skyrocketing. It reached its peak in the 
year 2015 with $87.19 billion and in the same year military expenditure/GDP ratio was the 
highest: military expenditure comprised 12.9% of the GDP. Then both figures started to 
decrease, which must be connected to the oil crisis and deterioration of the GDP, which led 
to economic problems in the country. Still, in 2017 the expenditure equaled $76.7 billion 
which is much more than the annual military budgets of all the other countries combined.  
All these figures matter a lot if we are trying to understand military doctrine and 
development vector of the GCC countries. Still, the plain numbers are not enough to 
understand the effectiveness of an army, as it can be examined only on the battlefield – and 
41 
 
that is why the next chapter will be very important. It will form the last component allowing 




2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Bahrain 0.94 1.02 1.24 1.33 1.53 1.52 1.48 1.48 
Oman 4.29 6.72 9.25 9.62 9.88 9.10 8.69  
UAE 9.32 9.32 13.90 14.40 
  
  
Saudi Arabia 54.22 61.35 70.31 82.52 87.19 81.5 76.7  
Kuwait 4.05 4.62 4.34 4.84 4.43 5.74 5.71  
Qatar 3.45 3.73 4.35 5.09 4.75 4.40          
  
Iran 26.4 25.2 14.8 15.9 14.2 15.9 16  










2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Bahrain 3.63% 3.84% 4.94% 3.9% 4.95% 4.77% 4.36%  
Oman 5.9% 8.4% 11.73% 11.95% 16.4% 13.72% 12.08%  
UAE 2.72% 2.6% 3.46% 3.6% 
  
  
Saudi Arabia 8.12% 7.79% 7.98% 10.38% 12.9% 12.6% 11.2%  
Kuwait 2.5% 2.64% 2.56% 2.7% 3.6% 5.17% 4.83%  
Qatar 2% 2.03% 2.15% 2.42% 2.84% 2.8%          
  
Iran 5.47% 4.59% 4.12% 3.82% 3.64% 3.86% 3.73%  












Figure 4.1: Military Expenditure of the GCC, graph (2011-2017). Source: The Military 
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Figure 4.2: Military Expenditure of the GCC (2011-2017), excluding Saudi Arabia. 
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Сhapter 3: Saudi Coalition Intervention into the Civil War of Yemen 
 The Civil War of Yemen started in the year 2004 as a smoldering Houthi 
insurgency, but evolved into full-fledged warfare by 2011. As of today, the decision of a 
Saudi-led coalition to participate in the war on Sunni president Hadi’s side has become the 
most recent and toughest “exam” of GCC military capabilities.  
 In the first years of war after the Yemeni Revolution of 2011, Houthi forces were 
successfully capturing new cities and gaining control over more and more territory. The 
offence quickly developed eastwards and by the spring of 2015, the Houthis possessed 
maximum territories since the beginning of the warfare until now. Tactical and morale 
advantage was on their side, and they had all the capability of moving forward while the 
disintegrated Yemeni army did not represent an irresistible obstacle. In these 
circumstances, president Hadi, who by that time had fled from the captured capital, did not 
have much choice but to ask for foreign intervention. Accordingly, on March 25, 2015, the 
foreign ambassador of the Yemeni government addressed the Arab League, requesting help 
in the struggle against Houthi militias that he considered “Iran’s puppet.” 70 The Arab 
League decided to discuss the issue, but Hadi’s speech probably represented a mere 
formality. The next day, March 26, the GCC (excluding Oman) began the operation 
“Decisive Storm,” which opened a new page in the Civil War of Yemen.  
OPERATION DECISIVE STORM 
As the operation was officially announced, eight countries were directly 
participating in the coalition. These were: 
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1. Saudi Arabia – 100 fighter jets; 150,000 soldiers; navy units; 
2. UAE – 30 jets, soldiers were later deployed 
3. Qatar – 10 jets (allegedly; their actual participation in the operation is unclear); 
4. Kuwait – 15 fighter jets; 
5. Bahrain – 12 fighter jets; 
6. Sudan – 4 jets; also, the country proposed to dispatch 6,000 soldiers but they were 
apparently not dispatched; 
7. Egypt – offered both aircraft and naval vessels, supposedly provided four warships 
and 800 troops; 
8. Jordan – officially supported the coalition, allegedly provided 6 fighter jets later 71 
Apart from these, two countries supported the coalition without direct participation 
in the conflict: 
 United States – president Barack Obama authorized logistic and intelligence 
support for the airstrikes; 
Pakistan – by April 2015, the country agreed to back an arms embargo against the 
Houthis.  
Earlier in this thesis it was mentioned that Oman refused to participate in the 
operation. From the very beginning, the country claimed neutrality in the conflict and did 
not support intervention. This means that officially the PSF structures could not be 
mobilized for the sake of this war, for – as already mentioned from the first chapter– its 
mobilization requires unanimous agreement of the GCC Supreme Council. Some PSF 
structures and experience could be theoretically used in this warfare, especially when the 
ground phase of the operation started and Saudi and the UAE troops needed to cooperate 
on the battlefield. But in general, this example only proved yet again the lack of PSF 
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flexibility, contradictions between the GCC members and their inability to unite quickly 
and effectively.  
In addition to the absence of unanimous support for intervention among the 
Supreme Council, we should remember that the PSF doctrine – although being rather 
unprecise – allows it to be used for protection from inner and outer threats, but not for 
foreign overseas operations. This might be another obstacle against mobilizing the PSF. At 
the same time, the goals of the intervention stated by Saudi Arabia as the coalition leader 
were exclusively defensive:  
• Securing stability in Yemen and maintaining “the legitimate, popularly-elected 
national government of President Abd-Rabbuh Mansour Hadi;” 
• Securing Saudi Arabia’s border; 
• Stemming Iran’s regional “expansionist” ambitions; 
• Combating terrorist threats (Al-Qaeda) 
• Safeguarding overall regional security72 
Of course, these aims only partly correlate with the actual context of the coalition’s 
(and first and foremost – Saudi) reasons and purposes behind intervention. For now, Saudi 
Arabia and Iran represent two main military and political powers of the region, and as 
Houthi militias are Shia, Iran from the very beginning was extremely prone to support their 
movement. According to evidence, since the initial stages of war, the Islamic Republic 
supported their allies with arms and other supplies.73 So, confronting Iranian interests 
would definitely be the first and most important reason to intervene. In addition, “overall 
regional security” actually means keeping Saudi influence unquestioned. It seems probable 
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that this influence and power has become much more solid and unquestionable after the 
intervention. While the main goal of the intervention continues to be full destruction of 
Houthi opposition and securing the future of Hadi’s regime, its aims could hardly be called 
solely “defensive.” 
Just as in the case of Russian intervention in Syria, where the expeditionary 
operation was prepared long before the actual intervention, it is hard to believe that an 
operation of such scale would be confirmed and prepared overnight. Most probably, the 
need of direct military participation became more and more obvious to the GCC as Houthi 
militias reached new successes on the battlefield and president Hadi’s call has just become 
an official rationale for the operation. The information in the previous chapter that pointed 
out the early guided bombs and other offensive arms purchases could prove this point. 
Decisive Storm followed several main tasks. The most important mission of this 
first phase of intervention was to destroy the Houthi air force in order to stop the developing 
offensive and win air supremacy. This task was swiftly and decisively completed within 
the first days of intervention, as air base Al-Dailami, where around 20 MIG-29’s were 
stored were destroyed by coalition bombings.74 Later on, anti-air turrets and most of the 
known ballistic missiles systems were annihilated. After that, Houthi infrastructure – 
logistics, transports etc. – was considerably damaged, which quickly stopped the militia’s 
offense and made them switch to defensive tactics. However, this destruction of the 
infrastructure played a major role in the following humanitarian crisis in Yemen.  
As a result of this first stage of intervention, the coalition managed to save Hadi’s 
regime, recapture Aden during the battle of Aden, considerably weaken Houthi militias 
and capture the initiative in the following warfare. The main feature of this stage was 
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extensive use of military jets for bombings and the absence of a massive ground operation 
(though according to several sources, Saudi Special Forces were deployed during the Battle 
of Aden, one of the key battles at this stage).75 On the 21st of April, [year], less than a month 
after the start of intervention, the goals of this first stage of the intervention were completed 
and operation Decisive Storm was announced to be over.  
OPERATION RESTORING HOPE: AIMS AND RESULTS 
After the success of Decisive Storm, Operation Restoring Hope began. Its main 
goal was a decisive victory over the Houthi forces and recapturing all Yemeni territory. 
The operation still has not been completed today. Due to the scattered character of 
information, a vast amount of speculation and reluctance of the GCC to make the number 
of losses and other war statistics public, the research of this topic becomes rather difficult. 
However, as long as the main purpose of this part of the thesis is to estimate the 
effectiveness of the GCC military intervention, it is sufficient to compare the actual results 
of the operation to the coalition’s plans and aims and analyze the progress and means used.  
As far as the final aim of the coalition was full and complete victory, let’s take a 
look at the military maps of the first two years of intervention and try to understand the 
amount of progress reached (Illustration 1.1). One should keep in mind that both maps 
represent the warfare after Aden operation and first successes of the coalition. This means, 
that the Coalition Forward Operation Base in Aden has already been established, the city 
of Ataq taken and the ground operation started. 
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Illustration 1.1: Zones of Military Control, Yemen, 2015 and 2017. Source: 
http://www.ecfr.eu/mena/yemen 
The analysis of this stage of the intervention does not speak in favor of the coalition. 
Of course, if we compare these two maps with Illustration 2.1, which represents the 
maximum expansion of Houthi control, we will see that the progress is rather significant. 
You may see a considerable development on the southwestern coast after the Aden 
operation, as Aden was captured and after that the frontline moved from the shore to the 
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cities of Ta’izz and Al-Bayda. In addition, on the eastern front, pro-Hadi forces captured 
the city of Ataq and developed their offense further to the west. However, all these 
operations were conducted on ground which was captured by Houthis pretty recently and 
where their influence was not as significant as in the west of the country. Hence when we 
start to discuss the progress of Operation Restoring Hope, during which the pro-Hadi 
forces, supported by Saudi and the UAE troops, struggled to recapture the Houthi’s 
“heartland,” including the Yemeni capital Sana’a, we may see that the coalition 
“blitzkrieg” failed. Even though the city of Ma’rib (to the west from the coalition base) 
was finally captured, the coalition did not manage to move the frontline much further to 
the west. While in the southwest the frontline near Al-Bayda moved a bit to the northwest, 
the city was not captured in 2017, and until now the pro-Hadi forces have only managed to 
secure its eastern part with the struggle continuing inside the city itself.76 The same 
insignificant progress may be seen in the south, where the city of Ta’izz was reached but 
is still not captured. In the spring of 2018, artillery bombings and violent clashes between 
the two sides are continuing in the city.77  
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Illustration 2.1: Maximum Houthi Expansion (2012-2015). Source: 
http://www.ecfr.eu/mena/yemen 
 
Over three years the GCC coalition was unable to make considerable progress, and 
Houthi militias engaged in furious resistance which managed to slow down and, on some 
fronts – stop its offense. As we know so far, Saudi Arabia deployed at least 150,000 soldiers 
in Yemen, the UAE sent soldiers too, the coalition deployed up to 180 jets to the country, 
and Saudi Special Forces took part in this warfare from the very beginning. It is true that 
some members of the coalition were reluctant to use their forces (like Qatar, for political 
reasons, and Jordan, for financial ones), but even if we take just the leading members – the 
54 
 
UAE and Saudi Arabia – we get at least 130 military jets (with total absence of any air 
force on the Houthis’ side), more than 150,000 soldiers, Special Forces and Latin American 
mercenaries which the UAE reportedly used during ground operations.78 According to 
several sources, these mercenaries’ numbers reached 30,000, and they were trained by the 
US.79 At the same time, Houthi militias represent a voluntary and non-professional army. 
Even though, according to some reports Iran helps Yemen with military advisors and 
provides some amount of training, it is hard to imagine the effectiveness of these secret 
activities could compete with the centralized and deeply financed training of the GCC 
forces.80  
The same may be said about the arms at the disposal of Houthis. Of course, Iranian 
help must provide a considerable effect on the development of the conflict. The arms 
exports from Iran are of great importance to Houthi militias: for instance, between Sept. 
2015 through March 2016, allied warships interdicted four Iranian dhows that yielded, in 
total, more than 80 antitank guided missiles and 5,000 Kalashnikov rifles, as well as sniper 
rifles, machine guns and almost 300 rocket-propelled grenade launchers, according to data 
provided by the United States Navy.81 According to the US admiral Donegan, these 
transfers are not simply individual deals – Iran sends these types of arms on a regular basis. 
In addition to that, other sources report that most of the arms probably did not come from 
Iran, but rather Houthi militias captured them during the 2012-2015 offense. These are 
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high-quality American arms purchased by the former Yemeni government (the one of 
president Saleh), and they include “more than 100 Humvees with the latest armor packages, 
100s of pickup trucks, rocket propelled grenades, advanced radios, night vision goggles 
and millions of rounds of ammunition.”82 Still, it is very hard to believe that the countries 
with some of the world’s highest military spending, and who purchase the most modern 
arms, could not overwhelm this Houthi arsenal even after a decisive victory in the air and 
securing of naval supremacy.  
PRICE OF THE OPERATION 
The last important aspect to analyze in this chapter is the price of the operation, for 
it is necessary to understand at what cost the coalition participates in this hardly successful 
warfare. Unfortunately for researchers, most of the GCC sources are reluctant to share 
information about the operation, especially about such “inconvenient” matters as civilian 
deaths and military losses. However, using the information provided by journalists and 
supranational and private research teams, we may build a more or less definite opinion 
about the price of the operation. 
In this context, we cannot exclude the Yemeni humanitarian crisis, which has 
become one of the most severe situations in today’s world. Since the beginning of the 
operation (without pre-March 2015 casualties) OHCHR – Office of the High 
Commissioner, United Nations Human Rights – has recorded a total of 13,504 civilian 
casualties, including 4,971 killed and 8,533 injured.83 Many of these people died of hunger 
and diseases due to the acute humanitarian situation in the country. A large part of this 
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crisis is attributable to the siege imposed on the Houthi territories by the coalition, which 
blocks most aid and all the commercial transfers from reaching the western part of Yemen 
by sea or land.84 As the “blitzkrieg” plan of the operation has failed, the consequences of 
this decision become more and more severe with the flow of time, as the provinces run out 
of food and medication . But the humanitarian crisis exists not only in Houthi territories. If 
you look at the Illustration 3.1, you will see that the food security condition of all the 
country’s territories is stressed (according to the European Council of Foreign Relations). 
Moreover, food security of Al-Jawf, Ma’rib and Aden provinces are at crisis level and 
Shabwa, Abyan and Lahij are at emergency.85 Most of these provinces are fully or almost 
fully controlled by pro-Hadi forces, and theoretically it would be the duty of the coalition 
to prevent humanitarian crisis there. Even though the Saudi government constantly 
emphasizes its humanitarian help to the people of Yemen, funding 124 projects totaling 
$847 million, these numbers do not seem impressive if one examines the tangible results. 
In addition to these humanitarian issues, Al-Qaeda forces used the vacuum and chaos of 
the military operation to assert control over several areas of the country. If you look at 
Illustration 4.1, the purple areas represent areas under Qaeda control. And even though the 
UAE liberation operation in the port of Al-Mukalla was successful with the support of the 
US forces, there are still areas and cities where this radical group enjoys significant 
control.86 
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Illustration 4.1: Al-Qaeda Presence in Yemen, 2017. Source: 
http://www.ecfr.eu/mena/yemen 
 
When we try to estimate military casualties though, the information we have at our 
disposal is rather scarce. Still, we know for sure that the coalition has experienced some 
considerable losses since the conflict’s start. For instance, in August 2016 Saudi Arabia 
signed a contract with the US for the purchase of 153 Abrams tanks. As it turns out, 20 of 
those tanks were “battle damage replacements” – so most probably these tanks were lost 
in Yemen. Also, according to the “Air Forces Monthly” journal, since the beginning of the 
intervention the coalition has lost 22 jets and helicopters, including 11 lost by Saudi 
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Arabia.87 However, we do not know for sure, how many (and if any) of them were brought 
down in combat, for some of these aircraft could have been lost from Houthi attacks with 
rockets on airbases. Other results were presented by Houthi general Sharaf Lukman during 
his interview to the Russian newspaper “AiF”. He said that since the beginning of the war 
Houthis have destroyed ten Apache helicopters, three F-16 jets and many drones. He also 
claimed that “dozens of tanks and hundreds of armored vehicles have been eliminated.”88 
The only country openly reporting their casualties is the UAE. From their reports, we know 
that at the end of Operation Decisive Storm, 3,000 soldiers were dispatched in Yemen, and 
during the following 15 months 80 of them became casualties of war.89 Finally, as already 
mentioned before, the coalition has been actively using mercenary power, and the losses 
among them remain unknown, which makes any analysis almost impossible and 
speculative.  
Based on this, in general we can see that the GCC coalition overwhelms Yemeni 
forces in manpower, technology, finances, air supremacy and is much better supplied with 
food and medication than the Houthi side. Still, the progress in the last three years has been 
not very significant, while associated damage and civilian casualties levels have grown 
decisively and led to one of the most serious humanitarian crisis in the world. At the same 
time, since the very beginning Oman declined to participate in the operation, which 
disabled the PSF mobilization and later Qatar stopped participation in the conflict due to 
Qatari crisis. Based on this analysis, we may claim that even though the GCC possesses a 
                                                 
87 «Воздушная война в Йемене: ход операции и потери участников,» [Air war in Yemen: logics of the 
operation and losses of the sides], Voennoye Obozrenie, September 2, 2017. https://topwar.ru/124027-
vozdushnaya-voyna-v-yemene-hod-operacii-i-poteri-uchastnikov.html 
88 «Генерал раскрыл потери арабской коалиции в Йемене» [General Revealed the losses by Arab 
Coalition in Yemen], Argumenti I Fakti, Janyary 19, 2016. 
http://www.aif.ru/politics/world/myatezhnyy_general_raskryl_poteri_arabskoy_koalicii_v_yemene 




considerable and extremely expensive military power, the use of it during the war has 
proved it to be relatively weak and ineffective. Taking into account the ineffectiveness of 
any GCC army and combining it with the internal contradictions and difference of opinions 
between the members, we may say that for now regional security provided by the Council 




Over recent years, both Saudi Arabia and UAE have been on the list of top-15 
countries in accordance with military expenditure.90 These countries are leading the 
coalition intervening in Yemen since 2015, and as described in the last chapter, this military 
operation cannot be called successful. We should keep in mind that in this case we are not 
talking about partisan warfare, which the US experienced in Iraq: the coalition is incapable 
of effectively breaking Houthi frontline and gaining final victory over their militias. At the 
same time, the task of maintaining regional security through the GCC armies means facing 
much more existential threats, first of which is potential conflict with the Iranian military, 
which is participating in the Yemeni conflict by means of proxy war. As a result, for now 
we should acknowledge the fact that the main task of the GCC security cooperation has not 
been reached. Moreover, the contradictions between the members which reached their 
culmination during the Qatari conflict put to question not only the idea of regional security, 
but also the concept of the GCC as an entity.  
The PSF initiative, which has become an incarnation of keeping security by means 
of a joint force, does not represent an effective organization for the chain of command 
proved to be inflexible and ineffective. In addition, there is no pattern for cooperation in 
supplying these forces and the joint doctrine of the Force is extremely blurred. These 
factors compromise its ability to react quickly and adequately to potential threats. On the 
country-level, the armies of Kuwait, Qatar and Bahrain might struggle with maintaining 
their countries’ security due to their size, and Saudi and the UAE armies, though being 
relatively large and well-equipped, have not shown appropriate effectiveness on the 
                                                 






battlefield. The task of maintaining regional security by the GCC forces will need 
considerable development on the level of its members’ armies and at the supranational 
level as well. The next steps to be made could include deepening cooperation and 
overcoming conflicts of interests, working on joint military doctrine, creating a 
supranational commanding force for the PSF and delegating a considerable amount of 
decision-making powers to it, improving the concepts of military training on the national 























































































• Sherpa (10) 






























• Baynunah (6/6) 
• MM-40-3 
Exocet (150/150) 
• CAPTAS VDS 
(1) 
• Ocean Master 
(2) 
• UMS-4110 (1) 

















































































• Rmah (2/2) 
Italy (2003-2010): 




• Abu Dhabi 
(1/1) 
• Marte-2 (100) 







• A-330 MRTT 
(3/3) 
Switzerland (2009): 


































































• CBU-97 SFW 
(250/250) 
























other aircraft types 
and guided bombs 
ordered in 2011. 
• MGM-140B 
ATACMS (100/100) 
• THAAD (2/2) 
 
2012   Italy: 
• Super 







































• RDR-1700 (?/2_ 















• K-6 120mm 
(63/63) 
• King Air 
(10/10) 
• King Air-


















































































• Bell-407 (30/30) 































• Fennek MPC 
(0/30) – uncertain 
• Q-01 (0/17) 
Spain: 




• MMV (50) 
China: 



















































• M-ATV (44/44) 
• MaxxPro 
(544/2482) 

















































• Helios-2 (0/2) 
Germany: 
• BR-710 (0/4) 
Italy: 






• ISB4 (50/50) 




























5009 (0/6, not 
ordered) 
France: 
• Exocet CDS 
(?) 













• Marte-ER (?) 
US: 







































“51 Houthis killed and wounded in the Mukhabarat west of Taiz,” Arab News, 
March 21, 2018. http://www.arabnews.com/node/1270531/middle-east. 
Aktas, Emel. SAFE-Q: Safeguarding Food and Environment in Qatar (Presented at 
Eco food supply chains, August 25, 2015). https://www.slideshare.net/EmelAktas/safeq-
safeguarding-food-and-environment-in-qatar 
Alalawi, Noura. “How Media Covered “Arab Spring” Movement: Comparison 
between the American Fox News and the Middle Eastern Al Jazeera” Cross Cultural 
Communication 11, no 10.  
“Al-Jazeera al-aksar mushahida arabiya,” [Al-Jazeera is the best-watched Arabic 
Channel], December 24, 2014, 
http://www.aljazeera.net/news/arabic/2014/12/24/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D8... 
Almasmari, Hakim and Abi-Habib, Maria. “Saudi Airstrikes Cripple Air Force in 
Yemen,” The Wall Street Journal, Updated March 29, 2015. 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/houthi-offensive-continues-in-yemen-1427635677 
Alsiri, Mohammed Faisal. Gulf Cooperation Council: Arabian Gulf Cooperation 
Countries Defense Forces (Peninsula Shield Force). School of Advanced Military Studies 
(United States Army Command and General Staff Colllege), January 2015 
Alwast” tanfaridu bi nashri nus ittifaki attijarati beina albahrein ua amrika [“Al-
Wast” Provides a Unique Copy of Free Trade Agreement between Bahrein and the US], 
Al-Wast, http://www.alwasatnews.com/news/393474.html 




“Arab states issue 13 demands to end Qatar-Gulf crisis.” Al-Jazeera, July 11, 2017. 
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/06/arab-states-issue-list-demands-qatar-crisis-
170623022133024.html 
Bandar Salman Mohammed Al-Saud. The GCC Security Convention: A Legal And 
Practical Analysis, PhD diss. University of Glasgow, 1997 
Baron, Adam. “Mapping the Yemen Conflict,” European Council on Foreign 
Relations, http://www.ecfr.eu/mena/yemen. 
BP Energy Outlook, 2017 edition, 
https://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/pdf/energy-economics/energy-outlook-2017/bp-
energy-outlook-2017.pdf 
Carlsen, Laura. „Mercenaries in Yemen—the U.S. Connection,“ The Huffington 
Post, https://www.huffingtonpost.com/laura-carlsen/mercenaries-in-yementhe-
u_b_8704212.html. 
Cullinane, Susannah & Karadesh, Jomana & Brown, Victoria. “Qatar delivers 
response to demands from Saudi-led bloc,” CNN, July 27, 2017 
Dardur, Nada. “Attahalif Al-Imarati Assaudi yuhaddidu majlisa atta’auni alhaliji,” 
[The Alliance between the Emirates and Saudi Arabia threatens the GCC] Sahifa Arabi 21, 
December 6, 2017. 
https://arabi21.com/story/1054312/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%A7%
D9%84%D9%81... 
Davidson, Christopher M., After the Sheikhs: The Coming Collapse of the Gulf 
Monarchies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 295 
El Yaakoubi, Aziz & King, Larry & Dalgleish, James, “U.S.-backed Yemeni troops 





Dehghanpisheh, Babak and King, Larry. “Iranian foreign minister urges regional 
cooperation after returning from Oman, Qatar,” Reuters, October 3, 2017.  
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-gulf-zarif/iranian-foreign-minister-urges-
regional-cooperation-after-returning-from-oman-qatar-idUSKCN1C82C6. 
The Editorial Board, “Fighting, While Funding, Extremists,” New York Times, 
June 19, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/19/opinion/saudi-arabia-qatar-isis-
terrorism.html. 
 Fisher, Max. “How the Saudi-Qatar Rivalry, Now Combusting, Reshaped the 
Middle East,” New York Times, June 13, 2017, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/13/world/middleeast/how-the-saudi-qatar-rivalry-
now-combusting-reshaped-the-middle-east.html.  
Hodgson, Camilla. “The 12 countries that spend the highest proportion of GDP on 
their military.” Business Insider, July 7, 2017, http://www.businessinsider.com/12-
countries-highest-military-budgets-percentage-of-gdp-2017-7?r=UK&IR=T. 
Ibish, Hussein. “The UAE’s Evolving National Security Strategy,” The Arab Gulf 
States Institute in Washington, April 6, 2017. http://www.agsiw.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/04/UAE-Security_ONLINE-2.pdf 
Jeffries, Stuart. “Is Germany Too Powerful for Europe?,” The Guardian, March 31, 
2013. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/mar/31/is-germany-too-powerful-for-
europe 





“Katar taukiu safkatan lishira’i mukatalyat if-15 bi qiimati 12 miljar dulyar” [Qatar 
signs deal to buy F-15 fighter jets worth $12 billion], BBC Arabic, January 15, 2017. 
http://www.bbc.com/arabic/middleeast-40285850 
Katzman, Kenneth. Qatar: Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy, March 1, 2018. 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/R44533.pdf 
Kostjunina, Galina and Lomakin, Nikolai. «Эволюция экономической 
интеграции в рамках ССАГПЗ,» [Evolution of Economic Integration inside the GCC 
framework]. Russian Herald of Foreign Economy, 2014, no 6., 87-102 
Kuffel, Glenn P., The Gulf Cooperation Council’s Peninsular Shield Force, 
(Report, Naval War College, 2000), 34 
Kuzmin, Vadim & Sokolov, Nikolay. «Действия Саудовской Аравии и Ирана в 
Йеменском конфликте в 2015-2016гг.» [Saudi Arabia and Iran activity in Yemen, 2015-
2016]. Mezhdunarodnye Otnoshenya [International Relations]., 165-175. 
http://elar.urfu.ru/bitstream/10995/52508/1/iuro-2017-167-18.pdf 
“List of demands on Qatar by Saudi Arabia, other Arab nations,” The Associated 
Press, June 23, 2017, https://apnews.com/3a58461737c44ad58047562e48f46e06. 
Mahmood, Ali. “Yemeni army advances in Al Bayda, Taez and Nehim,” The 
National, Updated March 6, 2018. https://www.thenational.ae/world/mena/yemeni-army-
advances-in-al-bayda-taez-and-nehim-1.709883. 
Maisa Mohammed Abdullah Al-Jabri, Gulf Security: Peninsula Shield Force and 






Malas, Nour & Abi-Habib, Maria & Karrar, Tahani. “U.A.E. Quits Gulf Monetary 
Union,” The Wall Street Journal, Updated May 21, 2009, 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB124285038025540481. 
Malsin, Jared. “U.S.-Made Airplanes Deployed in Libya's Civil War, in Defiance 
of U.N.,” Time, May 9, 2017. http://time.com/4746914/libya-civil-war-airplanes-haftar-
uae. 
McCarthy, Nail. “The Top 15 Countries For Military Expenditure In 2016 
[Infographic].” Forbes, April 24, 2017. 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/niallmccarthy/2017/04/24/the-top-15-countries-for-
military-expenditure-in-2016-infographic/#4718e8243f32 
Melkumyan, Elena and Kosach, Grigory, “[Совут Сотрудничества Арабских 
Государств Залива как региональная военно-политическая организация]”, “The Gulf 
Cooperation Council as regional military and political organization,” The University of 
Moscow Herald 25, no. 4 (2012): 39-69 
“Middle East and North Africa Regional Economic Outlook Oil, Conflicts, and 
Transitions.” IMF. May 5, 2015. 
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/reo/2015/mcd/eng/pdf/mreo0515p.pdf 
Military Balance, Chapter Seven: Middle East and North Africa, 2018. 
DOI:10.1080/04597222.2018.1416983. 315-374 
Nakhel, Emile A. The Gulf Cooperation Council: policies, problems, and prospects 
(New York: Praeger, 1986) 
Ostroukh, Andrey & El Yaakoubi, Aziz & Jones, Gareth. “Qatar in talks to buy 





Palmer, Richard. “Greece to Remain a European Colony Until 2060,” The Trumpet, 
February 27, 2017. https://www.thetrumpet.com/16984-greece-to-remain-a-european-
colony-until-2060 
Porther, Gareth. “Houthi arms bonanza came from Saleh, not Iran,” Middle East 
Eye, April 23, 2015. http://www.middleeasteye.net/columns/houthi-arms-bonanza-came-
saleh-not-iran-1224808066. 
“Qatar accuses the boycotting countries of putting the Gulf Cooperation Council at 
risk,” Middle East Monitor, September 1, 2017 
“Qatar-Iran ties: Sharing the world's largest gas field,” Al Jazeera News, June 15, 
2017. https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/interactive/2017/06/qatar-north-dome-iran-
south-pars-glance-lng-gas-field-170614131849685.html 
“Qatar’s ‘support for terror continues unabated’,” Gulf News, February 28, 2018, 
http://gulfnews.com/news/gulf/qatar/qatar-crisis/qatar-s-support-for-terror-continues-
unabated-1.2181052. 
Robertson, Nic and Almasmari, Hakim. “Saudi special forces help oppose Houthi 
rebels in Yemen, source says,” CNN, Update April 3, 2015. 
https://www.cnn.com/2015/04/03/middleeast/yemen-saudi-forces/index.html. 
Sabin, Lamiat. “Arab League: Leaders discuss unified military force while Saudi-
led air strikes in Yemen target Houthi militia dubbed 'Iran's puppet',” Independent, March 
28, 2015. https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/arab-league-leaders-
discuss-unified-military-force-while-saudi-led-air-strikes-in-yemen-target-10140918.html 
Salim, Al-Rawashdeh Mohammad “Gulf Cooperation Council States (GCC), 
Military Power, between Temporary Alliances and Permanent Joint Mechanisms,” 




“Saudi Arabia and the Yemen Conflict, April 2017 Report,” Saudi Embassy, April, 
2017. https://saudiembassy.net/sites/default/files/WhitePaper_Yemen_April2017_0.pdf 
Saul, Jonathan and El Dahan, Maha. “1-Qatar food imports hit after Arab nations 
cut ties - trade sources,” Reuters, June 5, 2017. https://www.reuters.com/article/gulf-qatar-
food/update-1-qatar-food-imports-hit-after-arab-nations-cut-ties-trade-sources-
idUSL8N1J23IC. 
Saul, Jonathan & Hafezi, Parisa & Georgy, Michael. “Exclusive: Iran steps up 
support for Houthis in Yemen's war – sources,” Reuters, March 21, 2017. 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-iran-houthis/exclusive-iran-steps-up-support-
for-houthis-in-yemens-war-sources-idUSKBN16S22R. 
Schmitt, Eric. “Iran Is Smuggling Increasingly Potent Weapons Into Yemen, U.S. 
Admiral Says,” New York Times, September 18, 2017, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/18/world/middleeast/iran-houthis-fifth-fleet-
admiral.html. 
Serebrov, Sergei. «Йеменский тупик: причины, угрозы, сценарии выхода» 
[Yemeni Dead End: Reasons, Threats, Exit Scenarios]. Analytic Note for Russian 
International Affairs Council. October, 2017 – №14. 
http://russiancouncil.ru/papers/Yemen-Policybrief14-ru.pdf 
 “Siege of Qatar 'arbitrarily splitting up families',” Al Jazeera News, December 14, 
2017. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/12/siege-qatar-arbitrarily-splitting-families-
171214163542163.html 
Simms, Brendan. “Germany’s triumph: from the ruins of war, how a new European 





Soghom, Mardo. “The Economic Incentive Behind Qatar's Iran Ties,” Radio Farda, 
June 5, 2017. https://en.radiofarda.com/a/iran-qatar--relations-economic-gas-fields-south-
pars/28529537.html. 
“Tafasil Alalaka alamania ua askaria beina Iran ua Qatar,” [The details of security 
and military relations between Iran and Qatar], Al-Arabiya, May 24, 2017. 
http://www.alarabiya.net/ar/iran/2017/05/24/%D8%AA%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%B5%D
9%8A%D9%84... 
“UAE Minister of Foreign Affairs Gargash: Solution to Qatar’s crisis is Riyad,” Al 
Arabiya English, March 3, 2018. 
https://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/gulf/2018/03/03/UAE-Minister-Gargash-Qatar-
should-stop-inflicting-harm-or-accept-isolation-.html. 




“UAE to train Yemeni resistance men for army.” December 20, 2015, Emirates 
24/7, https://www.emirates247.com/news/region/uae-to-train-yemeni-resistance-men-for-
army-2015-12-20-1.614538. 
Ulrichsen, Kristian Coates. “Qatar and the Arab Spring: Policy Drivers and 
Regional Implications,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, September 24, 
2014. http://carnegieendowment.org/2014/09/24/qatar-and-arab-spring-policy-drivers-
and-regional-implications-pub-56723. 




“Wazir alharijiyati alirani yazur katar lawal marratin ba’da bad’I alazmati 
alhalijiyati” [Iranian Foreign Minister visits Qatar for the first time since the beginning of 
the Gulf Crisis]. BBC Arabic. October 3, 2017. http://www.bbc.com/arabic/middleeast-
41479355 
“Wazir harijiyatin Katar: azmatu alhalij ta’uku attansika alamani” [Qatari Minister 
of Foreign Relations: Crisis of the Gulf Disturbs Security Coordination”  
“Yemen: Amid spike in casualties, UN relief official says civilians bearing brunt 
of ‘absurd war’,” UN News, December 28, 2017, 
https://news.un.org/en/story/2017/12/640582-yemen-amid-spike-casualties-un-relief-
official-says-civilians-bearing-brunt. 
“Yemen: Coalition Blockade Imperils Civilians,” Human Rights Watch, December 
7, 2017, https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/12/07/yemen-coalition-blockade-imperils-
civilians. 
“Yemen conflict: Troops retake Mukalla from al-Qaeda,” BBC News, April 25, 
2016, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-36128614. 
“Yemen's Hadi seeks UN military support to deter Houthis”, March 25, 2015, 
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2015/03/yemen-hadi-seeks-military-support-
deter-houthis-150324223355704.html 
«Воздушная война в Йемене: ход операции и потери участников,» [Air war in 
Yemen: logics of the operation and losses of the sides], Voennoye Obozrenie, September 
2, 2017. https://topwar.ru/124027-vozdushnaya-voyna-v-yemene-hod-operacii-i-poteri-
uchastnikov.html 
«Генерал раскрыл потери арабской коалиции в Йемене» [General Revealed the 





“США заключили соглашение о свободной торговле с Оманом” [The US 
signed the Free Trade Zone Deal with Oman], Vzglyad 
